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Article 
Shortcuts to Reform 
Heather K. Gerken† 
This Article is loosely organized around the idea that 
shortcuts can play a useful role in promoting election reform. 
Shortcuts are a well known phenomenon in elections scholar-
ship.1 The best known example is the party label, which pro-
vides voters an important heuristic for casting their vote. This 
Article focuses on what shortcuts can do to promote reform. It 
explains that shortcuts can and do play an important role in in-
fluencing three of the main leverage points for reform: voters, 
policymakers, and bureaucrats. The Article also proposes we 
create one such shortcut—a Democracy Index, which would 
rank states and localities based on how well their election sys-
tems perform—and explains why it ought to help create an en-
vironment more receptive to reform. Along the way, the Article 
offers some general observations about the challenges posed by 
election reform and how to solve them. 
Part I identifies what ought to be the central concern for 
those interested in election reform: we operate in a reform en-
vironment where change rarely takes root. Part II examines 
this problem in the context of election administration. It argues 
that partisanship and localism generate political tides that run 
against reform; it then proposes a Democracy Index as a poten-
tial solution. Part III argues that by providing a useful shortcut 
for the three main constituencies for reform—voters, policy-
makers, and bureaucrats—an Index could help create an envi-
ronment in which bigger, better reform is possible. Part IV 
 
†  J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to the 
participants in the symposium for helpful comments and to the many people 
who read and commented on my book, The Democracy Index: Why Our Elec-
tion System is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press, 2009), 
where these and other issues are explored in greater depth and nuance. Por-
tions of this essay are drawn from that book. Copyright © 2009 by Heather K. 
Gerken. 
 1. See sources cited infra notes 14–15. 
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briefly canvasses the costs associated with such a solution and 
weighs them against the potential benefits. The Article con-
cludes by offering examples of additional shortcuts that might 
help jumpstart reform in other election arenas. 
I.  THE “HERE TO THERE” QUESTION  
AND WHY IT MATTERS   
Scholars are quite aware of how hard it is to get election 
reform passed in the United States. I call it the “here to there” 
problem. We have a firm sense of what is wrong with our elec-
tion system (the “here”) and how to fix it (the “there”). But get-
ting from “here to there” has been remarkably difficult in the 
elections context. Reformers are fighting for change on difficult 
terrain, and scholars have spent too little time thinking about 
how to change the terrain itself. The vast majority of our scho-
larship has been devoted to the journey’s end, with precious lit-
tle devoted to figuring out how to smooth the path that leads 
there.2  
This is surprising. After all, most arguments for election 
reform depend on a single premise: process shapes substance. 
Academics are quick to claim that the structure of our political 
process (campaign finance law, redistricting rules) helps de-
termine the substance of our policies (who gets elected, what 
gets passed). But they do not apply that lesson to election 
reform. The structure of our political process also determines 
what kind of election reform gets passed. Or, in the case of the 
United States, it creates an environment where precious little 
gets passed.  
 
 2. There are, however, several exceptions to this general trend. See, e.g., 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory 
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005); 
Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating 
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184 
(2007) [hereinafter Gerken, Double-Edged Sword]; Heather K. Gerken, A 
Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 708 (2006); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct De-
mocracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 
(2006); Heather K. Gerken, Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform, ROLL CALL, 
Nov. 15, 2005 [hereinafter Gerken, Electoral Reform]; Posting of Christopher 
Elmendorf & Heather Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2005/11/next-time-start-with-people.html (Nov. 10, 2005, 23:40 EST);  Daniel 
P. Tokaji, The Moneyball Approach to Election Reform, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ, 
Oct. 18, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/051018 
.php. 
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If the work of reformers is to be something other than a Si-
syphean task, process should be an important scholarly focus. 
“Here to there” proposals may seem modest when compared to 
typical reform proposals, like calls for public financing or non-
partisan election administration. But these wide-ranging 
reform proposals have been met with a deafening silence. We 
have plenty of ideas about what kind of change we want. What 
we need is an environment in which change can happen. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND 
A POTENTIAL SOLUTION   
Let me give you an example of a “here to there” problem 
and a promising shortcut for moving toward a solution. The 
problem is our badly run election system. The best evidence we 
have suggests that our election system is clunky at best and 
dysfunctional at worst. Most experts agree that the system we 
use to run our elections is chronically underfunded, often poorly 
run, and sometimes administered in a partisan fashion.3 The 
problem is that we do not have a very good way to reverse the 
political tides that now run against reform. The solution I pro-
pose—a Democracy Index—should help do just that. 
A.  WHY ELECTION REFORM RARELY GETS TRACTION 
At first glance, it seems like it ought to be easy to reform 
our election system. After all, the basic ingredients for change 
exist. There is a fairly robust consensus that we have a prob-
lem. Improving how our democracy works is an intuitively pop-
ular cause. And there have been semi-regular crises (most not-
ably, Bush v. Gore4) to place the issue on the agenda. 
The problem, as I explore in greater detail in Part III, is 
that partisanship and localism generate political tides that run 
against change. Unlike most developed democracies, state and 
local officials run our elections, leading to what one scholar has 
termed “hyper-decentralization.”5 Because election problems 
 
 3. For ease of exposition, throughout this Article I will often use terms 
like “election system” to refer to our system of election administration—the 
“nuts-and-bolts” activities of running an election (registration, balloting, vote 
counting). The phrase usually refers to a far broader set of rules and institu-
tional arrangements, including those surrounding districting and campaign 
finance. 
 4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 5. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election Administration, 6 
ELECTION L.J. 118, 121 (2007) (reviewing ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND 
 2009] SHORTCUTS TO REFORM 1585 
 
are largely invisible to voters, the pressure of local competition 
pushes states to invest in things that voters can see—schools, 
roads, more cops on the beat—while neglecting the problems in 
our election system. Moreover, many of the local officials who 
run our elections have strong partisan ties. While bias is the 
most disturbing consequence of partisanship, it is not the most 
common. Perhaps the most unfortunate byproduct of partisan-
ship is a lack of professionalism. A system that depends on the 
political parties to staff it is unlikely to be staffed with trained 
experts.  
This unusual combination of partisanship and localism not 
only results in a poorly run system, but makes change hard to 
come by. At worst, election officials administer elections in a 
partisan or unprofessional fashion. At best, they have few in-
centives to invest in the system and lots of reasons to resist 
change. These factors combine to stymie change.  
1.  Partisanship  
For instance, the obvious solution to the problem of parti-
sanship is to replace politicians with bureaucrats whose jobs do 
not depend on their political standing. But when foxes are 
guarding the henhouse, it is hard to jettison them from that 
powerful station. The people who decide who decides—the fed-
eral and state legislators with the power to place our election 
system in the hands of nonpartisans—are partisans them-
selves. The party in control has little incentive to abandon this 
important weapon in its political arsenal. It is not a coincidence 
that election reform proposals tend to come from the party out 
of power, which loses interest in reform the moment it gains a 
majority of seats.  
2.  Localism  
As with partisanship, localism does not just undermine the 
quality of our system; it makes it hard to put a better one in 
place. When partisanship blocks change, it is because politics is 
working badly; representatives are putting their own interests 
ahead of their constituents’. But even when politics is working 
correctly—when politicians are attentive to what voters want—
political incentives run the wrong way in election reform. That 
is because problems in our election system are mostly invisible 
 
POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CON-
FIDENCE (2006)). 
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to voters. While the problems we saw in Florida in 2000 and 
Ohio in 2004—long lines, poor balloting machines, problems 
with registration, discarded ballots—occur all too often, voters 
become aware of them only when an election is so close that 
these mishaps affect the outcome. Because these crises occur 
episodically, voters have a haphazard sense of how well our 
elections are run and no comparative data to tell them which 
systems work and which do not.  
In a decentralized system like our own, the invisibility of 
election problems reduces the incentives for even reform-
minded politicians to invest in the system. One reason to favor 
decentralization is that states and localities will compete to win 
the hearts and minds of citizens, leading them to try to outdo 
each other in providing useful services and passing good poli-
cies. But states and localities will compete only along the di-
mensions that voters can see. When election problems are in-
visible, localities will invest in projects that voters can readily 
observe—new schools, roads, and more cops on the beat. In this 
respect, our failure to maintain our election infrastructure par-
allels our failure to maintain our physical infrastructure. Both 
occur because voters see only the occasional and haphazardly 
distributed results of neglect but have no means to gauge how 
things are working generally.  
3.  Voters’ and reformers’ lack of information 
Unfortunately, voters and reformers have been unable to 
alter this perverse political dynamic. Without comparative data 
on how election systems work, voters have only a haphazard 
sense of how well elections are run. We do not even know how 
many people cast a ballot during our last presidential election,6 
let alone how well our election system is performing. Voters 
learn that there is a problem only when an election is so close 
that the outcome is in doubt. That is like measuring annual 
rainfall by counting how often lightening strikes.  
Reformers similarly struggle in today’s political environ-
ment. Even when lightening strikes—when there is a crisis 
that could energize a coalition for change—debates about 
reform quickly descend into highly technical arguments about 
 
 6. Twenty percent of states do not report this information; they only dis-
close how many ballots were successfully counted. Thad Hall & Daniel Tokaji, 
Money for Data: Funding the Oldest Unfunded Mandate, ELECTION LAW @ 
MORITZ, June 5, 2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2007/06/money-
for-data-funding-oldest-unfunded.html. 
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things like direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines 
and residual vote rates that voters have no yardstick for judg-
ing. Similarly, when reformers manage to get policymakers’ at-
tention, they lack the information they need to make a credible 
case for change. Reformers work hard to overcome these ob-
stacles, but most ask policymakers to ignore their self-interest 
and do the right thing. It is little wonder that reform has not 
yet gotten much traction. 
4.  Bureaucrats’ lack of resources 
Finally, the people who represent the other main leverage 
point for reform—bureaucrats—are similarly handicapped in 
their efforts to improve our election system. The bureaucrats 
who run our system lack adequate training, funding, and staff. 
It is hard for local administrators to perform basic election 
functions, let alone spend time on activities that would improve 
the system, like collecting performance data or studying best 
practices. Moreover, election administrators’ pleas for more 
funds often fall on deaf ears, as politicians would much prefer 
to fund projects that are visible to voters.  
Even when reform is not costly, the tide of local competi-
tion runs against change. The financial capital of states and lo-
calities is limited, but so is their political capital. There are on-
ly so many issues that can make it on the agenda of top-level 
policymakers. Governors, legislators, even secretaries of state 
must pick and choose what issues will occupy their time. If vot-
ers do not pay much attention to a question, the odds are that 
state and local officials will not either. 
Localism also makes it harder to create professional norms 
that would push election officials to do better. It is not just that 
local administrators barely have the time and resources to do 
their jobs, let alone travel to conferences or study up on best 
practices. Localism means that professional associations are 
organized at the state level, thus preventing the type of cross-
state interactions that help good ideas spread. 
B.  A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 
In my forthcoming book,7 I propose a “here to there” solu-
tion for addressing these problems: a “Democracy Index,” which 
would rank states and localities based on how well their elec-
 
 7. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION 
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009). 
 1588 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1582 
 
tion system performs. The Index would function as the rough 
equivalent of the U.S. News and World Report rankings for col-
leges and graduate schools. It would focus on issues that mat-
ter to all voters: How long did you spend in line? How many 
ballots were discarded? How often did voting machines break 
down? The Index would not only tell voters whether things are 
working in their own state, but how their state compares to its 
neighbors.  
The Democracy Index would include nuts-and-bolts metrics 
(the length of lines, the number of ballots discarded) rather 
than broader measures of a state’s democratic health (cam-
paign finance laws, the robustness of political debate, or the 
level of electoral competition). It would be organized around 
three simple, intuitive categories that reflect the experiences of 
voters and mirror the cyclical rhythms of the administrator’s 
job: (1) registering voters, (2) casting ballots, and (3) counting 
votes. In each category, the Index would measure performance 
“outputs” (How many errors are in the registration lists? How 
long are the lines? How many ballots got discarded?) rather 
than policy “inputs” (How good is the registration system? Does 
the jurisdiction train its poll workers properly? Are ballots 
counted using “best practices”?). In measuring performance, the 
Index would rely on hard data over subjective assessments 
wherever possible.  
The Democracy Index is an information shortcut. It distills 
a wide variety of data on election performance into a highly in-
tuitive, accessible form: a ranking. There are dangers asso-
ciated with such shortcuts, as I discuss briefly in Part IV. In 
Part III, however, I will canvas the potential benefits that can 
come from creating such a shortcut. 
III.  SHORTCUTS AND LEVERAGE POINTS   
In this Part, I argue that if we focus on the key leverage 
points in the reform process—voters, policymakers, and elec-
tion administrators—there is good reason to believe that a De-
mocracy Index could do a great deal to smooth the path for 
change, creating an environment in which bigger and better 
reform is possible. 
A.  VOTERS 
Voters are a key leverage point in the reform process. We 
would not worry about partisanship or local competition if vot-
ers pressured elected officials to do the right thing. Unfortu-
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nately, it is often tough for reform proposals to gain traction 
with voters. That might seem strange given that the word “de-
mocracy” is invoked with reverence by school children and poli-
ticians alike. Everyone is affected by a badly run system. So 
why are voters not energized about these issues?8  
1.  Framing the issue  
While voters care about how elections are run, discussions 
about reform are largely inaccessible to them. As a robust polit-
ical science literature has demonstrated, voters need a “frame” 
to understand a problem and get behind a solution.9 Unfortu-
nately, election administration problems are hard to frame for 
voters in a manner that demonstrates their relevance. The dis-
cussion either takes place at such a high level of generality that 
 
 8. Public-choice scholars would not be surprised that an issue that af-
fects everyone is not at the forefront of the political agenda. Oddly enough, 
minority groups—sometimes condemned as “special interests”—are often the 
ones that succeed best in a majoritarian system like our own. See, e.g., Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). Politi-
cal scientist Robert Dahl famously claimed that “minorities rule” in the United 
States; coalitions of organized interest groups join together to form majorities 
and get legislation passed. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY 133 (1956). Or, as Jesse Jackson put it, “in politics, an organized mi-
nority is a political majority.” CNN: Both Sides with Jesse Jackson, (CNN tel-
evision broadcast Jan. 30, 2000). What matters in a system where “minorities 
rule” is the ability to organize—to turn out the vote, lobby representatives, 
and raise money. And it is often easier to organize a small, easily identified 
group with a concrete complaint than it is to get a large majority affected by a 
diffuse harm to coalesce. The public-choice explanation is not, of course, a 
complete answer. Other problems that impose diffuse harms are salient to 
voters—and thus to politicians. Politicians are careful to sketch out positions 
on issues like the environment or foreign policy. Moreover, politicians are no-
toriously risk-averse; no politician is going to be wildly enthusiastic about 
flouting the preferences of the majority even when no special-interest group is 
there to fight about it. 
 9. Building on the work of Erving Goffman, see ERVING GOFFMAN, 
FRAME ANALYSIS, AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974), 
social scientists have extensively analyzed the ways that issues are presented 
to, and affect the behavior of, voters. For a sampling of this literature, see, for 
example, FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTA-
BILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, 
NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION (1987); WILLIAM 
H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); DEBORAH A. STONE, 
POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON (1988); Dennis Chong & James N. 
Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007); James N. 
Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the 
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671 (2004);  Deborah A. 
Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 
281 (1989). 
 1590 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1582 
 
people have no sense of what ought to be done, or it descends 
into a sea of incomprehensible detail that would try the pa-
tience of even the wonkiest voter. 
When reformers make their pitch, they often speak in stir-
ring terms, invoking democracy, the dignity of the ballot, the 
right to vote. You can practically hear the National Anthem 
playing in the background. This is all well and good, but the 
National Anthem does not give a citizen much to go on. Moreo-
ver, everyone can play the patriotism game; election officials 
can also claim the moral high ground and accuse the other side 
of neglecting fundamental principles. As any parent knows, it 
is hard to resolve an argument whose basic rhetorical structure 
is some variant of “am not, are too.”  
Things are little better when reformers and election offi-
cials swoop from these lofty heights to what election scholars 
call “the weeds.” Reformers “have to talk mostly in generali-
ties,” claims Jonah Goldman of the National Campaign for Fair 
Elections, because the underlying policy debates seem so 
“dull.”10 The subject matter is arcane. Fights often involve in-
tricate debates about counting ballots, jargon-filled discussions 
of election machinery, and disputes about nitty-gritty registra-
tion requirements. Even election junkies rarely have the sto-
mach for it.  
More importantly, these are debates that voters have no 
yardstick for judging. Reformers point to a problem—an inade-
quate registration system, outdated machinery, a poor system 
for training poll workers—and argue that the state can do “bet-
ter.” Election officials respond by talking about regulations is-
sued, resources allocated, and staff trained. Reformers talk 
about discarded ballots or unregistered voters. Election officials 
assure us these numbers are normal.  
For voters, these debates are reminiscent of that famous 
Far Side cartoon about what dogs hear. The clueless owner 
prattles away to his pet, and all the dog hears is “____, ____, 
____, Ginger. ____, ____, Ginger, ____.”11 So what do voters hear 
when reformers and administrators go at it? A stream of tech-
nical details, occasionally punctuated with grand terms like 
“the right to vote” or “democracy.”  
 
 10. Interview with Jonah Goldman, Dir., Nat'l Campaign for Fair Elec-
tions (Jan. 4, 2008) (on file with the author). 
 11. Gary Larson, The Far Side, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1983, at 51. 
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Voters are not stupid.12 But no one is born with a strongly 
held intuition about whether optical scan systems are a good 
idea, or whether provisional ballots should be counted only if 
they are cast in the correct precinct. Voters need a guide to help 
them figure out who is right. 
The Democracy Index could help change these dynamics by 
giving voters a yardstick to judge these fights. First, it gives 
voters the right information. Rather than bogging voters down 
in technical details about how the ideal system would be run or 
making vague assertions that we could do “better,” reformers 
could give voters information on something they can evaluate: 
bottom-line results.  
Second, the Democracy Index presents the information in 
the right form by distilling the data into a highly intuitive, ac-
cessible format: a ranking. Voters do not need to wade through 
reams of data in order to assess how things are working. The 
Index, in effect, gives them a shortcut for making that judg-
ment. Moreover, because the Index grades election systems “on 
a curve”—measuring them against one another instead of some 
ideal standard—voters can feel confident that they are reward-
ing those who have succeeded while holding those on the bot-
tom rung to a realistic standard of performance.  
2.  Jumpstarting grassroots organizing 
The most optimistic hope for the Index is that it will en-
courage voters to get more engaged with grassroots activities. 
It is not surprising that voters have been passive about election 
reform until now. Current debates put voters in a situation 
where they have nothing to contribute. Everyone can invoke 
the same vague generalities about the right to vote. But if vot-
ers are going to talk about policy, they would have to master a 
daunting set of minutiae. Otherwise, even if the average voter 
had some impulse to write her representative or call a radio 
talk show or organize a petition drive, she would find she had 
nothing to say. 
 
 12. Many scholars argue, with some evidence, that voters cast their bal-
lots in an irrational fashion. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RA-
TIONAL VOTER (2007). Arguments like these often underestimate the useful 
role that heuristics can play in guiding voting behavior. See, e.g., David 
Schleicher, Irrational Voters, Rational Voting, 7 ELECTION. L.J. 149 (2008) 
(reviewing CAPLAN, supra). 
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Ranking systems are useful because, as Dan Esty observes, 
they “democratize who can render an opinion.”13 (Whether you 
think the opinion is properly informed is a different question, 
explored in Part IV). Everyone can express a view on whether 
his state ought to be ranked higher than forty-fifth on the De-
mocracy Index. By giving voters an issue they can wrap their 
hands around, it may be possible to get voters exercised about 
election reform. After all, the rare instances in which voters 
have gotten engaged with grassroots organizing—issues like 
paper trails or voter ID—have all involved issues that appeal to 
people’s intuitions.  
The Democracy Index would also expand the grassroots or-
ganizer’s time frame. In a world without data, people only get 
riled up about reform when there is a crisis. Once a winner is 
picked, the media coverage that keeps voters engaged ends ab-
ruptly. Reformers thus have a very short time to organize a 
coalition for change. An Index, however, ensures that the 
reform remains salient long after a crisis (and even in its ab-
sence). A ranking creates a durable reminder that a problem 
exists. By expanding the organizer’s time horizon, the Index 
may help build support for change over the long haul.  
3.  Giving voters an information shortcut 
Even if the Democracy Index does not spawn new gras-
sroots organizing, it should at least help voters do something 
that they already do: cast a vote. The great advantage of rank-
ing systems is that they offer voters information shortcuts for 
holding elected officials accountable for their missteps. Creat-
ing a new shorthand for voters ought to affect the political in-
centives that currently run against reform. 
For those who bristle at the idea of voters’ using shorthand 
to evaluate the way our elections are run, it is worth pointing 
out that voters will inevitably use some sort of shorthand in 
casting a ballot. In most cases, party labels serve as a heuristic 
for voters choosing a candidate.14 The label “Democrat” or “Re-
 
 13. Interview with Dan Esty, Hillhouse Professor of Envtl. Law and Poli-
cy, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Conn. (Oct. 24, 2007) (on file with the au-
thor). 
 14. For early work in what is now a vast literature, see, for example, 
JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF PO-
LITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995); BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A 
STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1954); ANGUS 
CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); V.O. Key, Jr. & Frank Mun-
ger, Social Determinism and Electoral Decisions: The Case of Indiana, in 
 2009] SHORTCUTS TO REFORM 1593 
 
publican” functions like a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approv-
al.” It tells the voter that the candidate in question subscribes 
to a set of values or policy preferences that are close enough to 
the voter’s to choose him.15 As several scholars have explained, 
if a voter “knows the big thing about the parties, he does not 
need to know all the little things.”16  
Political scientists have devoted a lot of energy to making 
party cues function more effectively for a simple reason: they 
are a good deal better than the other types of shorthand voters 
might use.17 Without the party heuristic, voters would be more 
likely to base their votes on something unappetizing, such as a 
candidate’s race or gender. Or they might cast ballots randomly 
so that voter preferences are disconnected from electoral out-
comes. The basic defense of party labels is not that they are 
perfect—far from it—but that they are the best thing we have 
got. If you ask a political scientist whether it is a good idea for 
voters to rely on party cues, the likely response will be a sar-
castic “as opposed to what?” 
If we think about the “as opposed to what” question here, a 
ranking system looks a good deal more appealing. Think about 
the proxies voters are likely to use today in casting their vote 
for election officials. The best bets seem to be (1) anecdotal evi-
dence, (2) news about a widely reported crisis, or (3) partisan 
cues. For all its potential shortcomings, a ranking system is su-
perior to each of these alternatives. 
Anecdotal evidence is, of course, just that. A glitch here 
and there is not good evidence of a full-fledged problem. A 
ranking system, in contrast, focuses voters on the bigger pic-
 
AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR 281 (Eugene Brudick & Arthur J. Brodbeck eds., 
1959). 
 15. See, e.g., Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585, 590 (1997); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclo-
pedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elec-
tions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994); Arthur Lupia, Dumber than Chimps? 
An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE 
BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 
2001); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER (2d ed. 1994). 
 16. BERELSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 321. 
 17. Indeed, a major movement within political science insists that we 
need strong, cohesive parties in order to give voters a better predictive cue as 
to how candidates will vote. Better party cues, the argument goes, means 
greater accountability. This notion of “responsible party government” was first 
endorsed by the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Politi-
cal Parties in 1950. See Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. (Supp. 1950).  
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ture, directing their attention to systemic concerns instead of 
the modest anomalies that can afflict even well run systems. It 
also directs their attention to the good as well as the bad and 
the ugly, revealing which states and localities have done an es-
pecially impressive job of running elections. 
Even evidence of a crisis may not be a useful guide for vot-
ers. While the worst-run systems are more vulnerable to a cri-
sis, not all badly run systems will experience a crisis. Indeed, 
given the dearth of the data, we cannot definitively rule out the 
possibility that recent brouhahas (Florida 2000, Ohio 2004) 
have happened in relatively well-run systems, places that just 
happened to be in the path of a turnout tsunami. Crisis-based 
voting also has the flavor of closing the barn door after the 
horse has been stolen. Voters need a tool that will help them 
prevent crises rather than merely react to them. 
Finally, partisan cues do not provide a dependable heuris-
tic for voters in the context of election reform. A party label can 
tell a voter whether a candidate is liberal or conservative and 
thus indicate to a voter how a candidate is likely to approach 
issues like campaign finance or felon disenfranchisement. But 
in choosing an election administrator, voters need shorthand 
for evaluating professionalism and performance, and the party 
cue does not help. Democrats and Republicans are equally sus-
ceptible to running elections badly.  
For all of these reasons, the Democracy Index has the po-
tential to provide voters with a much needed shorthand for 
casting a vote. By conveying information about the “big thing” 
in election administration—a rough sense of how well the sys-
tem performs overall—it enables voters to make sensible deci-
sions without knowing all of “the little things” buried in the da-
ta. 
If the Democracy Index provides voters with a useable 
shorthand, it ought to generate a new political dynamic in the 
reform environment. The current system offers politicians and 
local officials few reasons to pay attention to reform issues. The 
Index may give political actors more incentives to pay attention 
to how elections are run if votes start to turn on performance. 
4.  Realigning partisan incentives 
Consider, for instance, the fate of Ohio’s Secretary of State, 
Kenneth Blackwell, whose travails as Secretary of State are 
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well known.18 In 2006, Blackwell ran for governor. Imagine if 
Ted Strickland, the Democrat running against him, could have 
shown that Ohio was one of the worst-run election systems in 
the country. Surely Strickland would have trumpeted those re-
sults whenever he could. You can also be sure that secretaries 
of state across the country would take notice of that campaign.  
An Index would also be invoked by election officials whose 
systems rank high. Candidates are always on the hunt for 
something to distinguish them from their opponents, some 
“Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” to attract voters’ atten-
tion. We see lots of examples of this type of self-promotion with 
other rankings. For instance, the latest release of the Govern-
ment Performance Project, which grades state management 
practices, prompted immediate press releases by the governors 
of the top-ranked states.19  
The Index will not only matter during the campaign sea-
son. It is also likely to be used in any recount battle. Parties 
wage recount wars on two fronts. In court, the parties’ job is to 
get their ballots counted and their opponents’ excluded.20 Any 
lawyer worth her salt will try to introduce the Index into evi-
dence if it helps her case. 
Parties also battle in the arena of public opinion, trying to 
enlist voters in their effort to win the legal battle and score po-
litical points. And it is hard to imagine that neither party 
would invoke the Democracy Index in framing the recount de-
bate for public consumption. After all, if the state ranked low, it 
would provide further evidence that the party in power failed to 
do its job properly. Conversely, if the state generally scored 
high on the Index, the party in power could use it as a shield 
against the accusations being levied by its opponents.  
Should the Democracy Index be deployed in either context, 
it ought to help raise public awareness about the need for 
 
 18. For a summary of Blackwell’s travails, see GERKEN, supra note 7, at 
ch. 3.  
 19. News Release, Office of Governor Christine Gregoire, Washington 
Earns Top Rating for Managing Public Resources (Mar. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressrelease=804&newsType 
=1; News Release, Office of Governor Timothy M. Kaine, Virginia Gets Top 
Grade in Performance (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.governor 
.virginia.gov/mediarelations/newsreleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=621. 
 20. For example, see the Coleman versus Franken Minnesota 2008 elec-
tion Senate recount and following court action.  See generally  Dave Orrick and 
Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Franken’s Lead Increases to 312 Over Coleman in 
Minnesota U.S. Senate Race, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Apr. 7, 2009. 
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reform and create incentives for politicians to get behind it. If 
there is any lesson to be drawn from successful efforts at elec-
tion reform in other countries, it is that the most effective pro-
ponent of reform is usually the opposing party. When the party 
out of power has a weapon—an advisory commission report, a 
judicial ruling, a ranking system—it will use it to beat on the 
other party at every opportunity. It is ugly, but effective. 
Even setting aside political races and recount wars, one 
can imagine other ways in which the Index might be used as a 
sword or shield in partisan politics. For instance, election offi-
cials at the bottom of the list might be vulnerable to targeted 
fundraising or get-out-the-vote organizing by political blogs like 
DailyKos21 or RedState.22 Similarly, any politician dissatisfied 
with an election rule would surely invoke the Index. The Index, 
after all, makes an instance of special pleading look like a de-
fense of the public interest.  
For all of these reasons, the Democracy Index should hang 
like a sword of Damocles over politicians, a notoriously risk-
averse group. While it will not be salient in every race, it 
should matter in some. That would mean that at least some of 
the time, the fate of elections officials would hinge in part on 
their professional performance, not just their party standing. 
Instead of asking an election official to stop thinking about her 
political interests in administering the election process, the 
Democracy Index links her political fate to her professional per-
formance. 
5.  Will party heuristics trump?  
A skeptic might still insist that the party heuristic—
whether someone has an “R” or “D” by her name—is all that 
really matters for low-salience campaigns like races for the sec-
retary of state.23 The worry is that party labels will drown out 
any competing information about candidates except during 
well-publicized campaigns for higher office, like Kenneth 
Blackwell’s gubernatorial campaign. But even if partisan heu-
ristics generally trump all else, a low ranking can still affect a 
candidate’s political fate. To begin, the Index ought to matter 
when the party heuristic is unavailable—during the primary, 
 
 21. Daily Kos: State of the Nation, http://www.dailykos.com (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2009). 
 22. Redstate, http://www.redstate.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
 23. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in 
City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law, 14 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007). 
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when candidates compete against members of their own party, 
or during the general election in a nonpartisan race. In these 
low-information races, voters do not have a party label to sort 
candidates, so any means of distinguishing one candidate from 
another is potentially important. Indeed, not only should the 
Index itself provide a heuristic for voters, but it should also af-
fect which organizations and newspapers endorse the candi-
date, thus influencing another basis on which voters cast their 
ballots.  
Further, even in races where the party heuristic matters, 
the Index may affect the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that 
determines which candidates get nominated. Party elites play 
an important role in the candidate selection process. During 
this “invisible primary,” their decisions about funding and en-
dorsements can determine who ends up running and winning 
the party primary.24 Imagine that you were a party leader, ma-
jor donor, or get-out-the-vote organizer. There are a large num-
ber of candidates competing for your support. Why would you 
back someone whose ranking has rendered him potentially 
damaged goods? And would not a high ranking increase a can-
didate’s standing in your eyes? Even if the ranking will matter 
only rarely, a risk-averse political operative will prefer to place 
a bet on someone without any handicaps. These behind-the-
scenes decisions all matter to a candidate’s political fate, and 
they all increase the likelihood that politicians will care about 
how their state or locality ranks on the Index.  
6.  Realigning local incentives 
As noted in Part I, partisanship is not the only reason our 
election system does not function as well as it should. Even 
when politics are working correctly—when politicians are at-
tentive to what voters want—political incentives run against 
election reform. Local officials compete only on issues that vot-
ers can see. When a problem is invisible, a race to the bottom 
ensues. 
A ranking system not only makes the problems in our elec-
tion system visible to voters, but it casts those issues in expli-
citly competitive terms. By ranking states and localities against 
one another, the Democracy Index should help shame local offi-
cials into doing the right thing.  
 
 24. Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 131, 151 (2005). 
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Consider, for instance, the competition that seems to have 
been spurred by one of the rare comparative metrics we have in 
election administration: the residual vote rate. In the wake of 
the 2000 election, reformers and political scientists used the re-
sidual vote rate as a rough proxy for assessing how many votes 
had been lost to machine problems, bad ballot design, and the 
like. As a CalTech/MIT study observes, when jurisdictions 
“were told they had high residual rates in 2000,” many “worked 
to cut them to a fraction of what they were by 2002,”25 even be-
fore Congress provided funding for new machines. Georgia, for 
example, had a high residual vote rate of 3.2% in 2000 but re-
duced it to 0.9% by 2002.26 Reformers continue to rely on the 
residual vote rate to pressure localities to do better. A recent 
Brennan Center report, for instance, argues that residual vote 
rates should not be higher than one percent.27  
We see a similar effect with other ranking systems. Take 
the Government Performance Project (GPP), sponsored by the 
Pew Center on the States, which grades states based on their 
management practices.28 The GPP has had a remarkable 
amount of success pushing states to do better on the manage-
ment front. For instance, its emphasis “on the importance of 
workforce planning appeared to be central to enormous ad-
vances in the area,” says Richard Greene, who has played a ma-
jor role in its implementation.29 While half of the states did 
such planning in 2005, forty-one did so by 2008.30 
You can also see the GPP’s effects on individual states. In 
Georgia, for instance, the governor made the state’s low rank-
ing a central platform of change. The state began to measure 
 
 25. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, INSURING THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSISTENT AND COM-
PLETE REPORTING OF ELECTION DATA 2 (2004), available at http://vote.caltech 
.edu/drupal/files/report/insuring_integrity_of_electoral_process.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Brennan Center Report 
Finds New Improvements in New Voting Technology Being Implemented in 
Several States (Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
content/resource/brennan_center_report_finds_improvements_in_new_voting_ 
technology_being_imp. 
 28. Pew Center on the States: About Us, http://pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
about.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).   
 29. Interview with Richard Greene, Consultant, Pew Ctr. on the States 
(June 12, 2008) (on file with the author). Unless otherwise noted, what follows 
in the next two paragraphs is drawn from an interview with Richard Greene.  
 30. See David S. Broder, Managing: An Affair of States, WASH. POST, Mar. 
9, 2008, at B7. 
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itself against the GPP’s criteria and has dramatically in a short 
time, moving itself from a B to a B+ in three years.31 Similarly, 
when the first GPP gave Alabama the lowest grade received by 
any state, state officials invited the GPP’s architects to speak to 
its leadership and has been “getting steadily better” on all 
fronts, says Greene. Greene thinks Alabama’s improvement is 
particularly impressive because success “is a moving target,” as 
all of the states are improving at the same time.32 
A skeptic might worry that local competition matters only 
for issues that are important enough for people to “vote with 
their feet,” like schools and taxes. But it is a mistake to assume 
that people must vote with their feet before local officials will 
pay attention. Politicians pay attention to issues even when 
they have a captive constituency. They do so for a simple rea-
son. They are risk-averse and would rather represent happy 
constituents. Local officials worry not only about latent crises 
that might develop, but the cumulative effect of one bad head-
line after another. They also like to tout their successes, which 
is why one often sees high rankings proudly announced on local 
and state websites.  
The worry about captive constituencies is nonetheless well 
taken. It reminds us to recognize the limits of any strategy de-
signed to generate a “race to the top” in election reform. There 
are lots of issues competing for voters’ attention, and a ranking 
system is not going to push election reform ahead of bread-and-
butter issues like jobs and the economy. States will continue to 
feel pressure to commit resources to the many other problems 
they face. What the Democracy Index does is give election 
reform a much-needed boost in this competition for resources. 
And that is a good deal better than nothing. 
7.  Do people care enough about election reform for an Index to 
work? 
The arguments above depend on a crucial assumption: that 
some voters will care about election administration some of the 
time. If they do not, giving voters an information shortcut will 
not matter much. Indeed, a skeptic might argue that voters will 
never care enough about reform to pay attention to a ranking. 
After all, it is not hard to imagine why the U.S. News and 
 
 31. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, 
GRADING THE STATES: GEORGIA (2005), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/gpp2005 22.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).  
 32. Interview with Richard Greene, supra note 26.  
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World Report college rankings are read by so many people—
anyone with a kid applying to college has a personal stake in 
knowing how the colleges stack up. But our relationship to elec-
tion administration is more tenuous and less personal.  
Although we cannot know for sure whether a Democracy 
Index would have an effect on voters, it would be a mistake to 
infer that voter preferences are fixed. Voter opinions tend to be 
quite fluid. They are shaped by institutions, the media, and po-
litical elites. Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued 
that the ability to define a problem and its solution “is the su-
preme instrument of power,”33 an idea buttressed by a long-
standing political science literature on the importance of “fram-
ing.”34 Thus, in assessing voter preferences, we must think in 
dynamic terms. 
There are several reasons to be optimistic about the Index’s 
potential. First, other indices have made a splash even though 
they do not involve issues that affect people as directly as the 
quality of their children’s education. The Environmental Per-
formance Index, for instance, had an effect on environmental 
policy well before the the world and his wife became cognizant 
of global warming. And the Government Performance Project’s 
evaluation of state management systems—a topic that surely 
ranks below election reform on the boredom scale—generates 
hundreds of news stories whenever it is released. Unless re-
porters and politicians have an absolutely tin ear on these 
questions, that is a sign that something is afoot.  
Second, reformers have been able to get traction on election 
issues when they frame them effectively. As Jonah Goldman 
points out, debates about paper trails have become salient in 
large part because reformers came up with a simple metaphor 
for capturing the problem: if we can get a receipt from an ATM, 
touch-screen vote machines should be able to generate a paper 
trail.35 That frame drives some experts crazy because they 
think it fundamentally mischaracterizes the problem.36 But it 
 
 33. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S 
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (1960) (emphasis omitted). 
 34. See sources cited supra note 9.  
 35. Interview with Jonah Goldman, supra note 10. For an excellent over-
view of the role of framing in this debate, see R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. 
HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF DIGITAL DE-
MOCRACY (2008). 
 36. See generally, Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting 
and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1807 (2005).  
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is certainly driving policymaking,37 confirming physicist G.C. 
Lichtenberg’s observation that “a good metaphor is something 
even the police should keep an eye on. . . . .”38 If the Index can 
provide a similarly intuitive frame for the public, it too ought to 
be able to get traction with voters. At the very least, there are 
enough stories on election administration controversies these 
days that a Democracy Index would surely generate some 
press, even if it were only a sidebar to ongoing reporting.  
Finally and most importantly, the key difference between 
the Democracy Index and many other indices is that the De-
mocracy Index has a ready-made ally that cares deeply about 
this information: political parties. As is clear from the preced-
ing discussion, political parties can use the Index for partisan 
advantage if they get the word out. Partisan politics—the en-
gine that drives most public debates39—offers a built-in publici-
ty machine for making the Democracy Index salient. 
The problem for election reformers in the past is that they 
have had a hard time harnessing political competition in the 
service of election reform. Though reform issues bubble up dur-
ing an election crisis, for the most part politicians ignore them. 
Without political entrepreneurs to take up the cause, it is hard 
to get reform on the agenda. The fact that the Democracy Index 
 
 37. See, e.g., Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 
(Holt Bill), H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 38. GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG, APHORISMS 79 (R.J. Hollingdale 
trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1800–06 and 1844–53). 
 39. Political competition represents an important force in shaping public 
opinion. As Robert Bennett explains, “American democracy is an extraordi-
nary engine for producing a conversation about public affairs” that ultimately 
shapes “the content of public policy decisions . . . .” ROBERT W. BENNETT, 
TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2003). The fuel 
for that engine is political competition, as political leaders compete against 
one another to “shape, coordinate, and frame the public’s understandings 
about electoral politics, public policy, and civic affairs.” Michael S. Kang, Race 
and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 753 (2008). The literature on 
the relationship between political competition and public opinion dates back at 
least to the work of venerable political scientists like V.O. Key, Jr. and E.E. 
Schattschneider. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 
1936–1960 (1966); SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 33. Scholars often call these 
leaders “political entrepreneurs” because of the creative ways in which they 
forge new platforms, frame issues, and exploit latent political energies in the 
process of building new political coalitions. See, e.g., Kang, supra, at 738 n.17. 
For a necessarily incomplete sampling of the seminal work in this area, see, 
for example, ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1972); KEY, supra; WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHE-
TORIC (Randall L. Calvert et al. eds., 1996); and SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra 
note 33. 
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turns election reform into a source of political advantage in-
creases the likelihood that entrepreneurs will take up the 
cause. When politicians see a potentially useful weapon, they 
will fire it.40 
B.  POLICYMAKERS 
The arguments above portray politicians in a rather bad 
light—as craven creatures motivated by self-interest. Political 
incentives plainly matter to elected officials, and it is important 
to be aware of them in thinking about the “here-to-there” prob-
lem. But the vast majority of elected officials try to do the right 
thing within existing political constraints. We therefore should 
not underestimate the appeal of the right answer to politicians. 
The appeal of the right answer is another reason that the De-
mocracy Index should get the attention of the top-level officials 
who set policy and hold the purse strings. A performance index 
is something that appeals to every politician’s inner wonk; it 
gives them a much-needed information shortcut to identify 
lawmaking priorities and choose among policy options. 
1.  Giving politicians a baseline 
In many ways, the Index serves the same purpose for top-
level policymakers as it does for voters: it gives them a base-
line, an information shortcut for refereeing debates between 
the election administrators who work for them and the refor-
mers who lobby them. Policymakers see plenty of untrustwor-
thy arguments coming from administrators who are not doing 
their jobs properly. Many grow tired of the insistent drum beat 
for change emanating from the reform community. Top-level 
policymakers have to pick sides, and they do not have time to 
work through all the details. They need an information short-
cut to guide them. 
While top policymakers may be reluctant to hold election 
officials accountable based on the necessarily atmospheric 
judgments of the reform community, they are likely to be con-
vinced by hard numbers and comparative data. Election admin-
istrators can talk all they want about what they have done, but 
they cannot get around the stark reality of the ranking: is the 
 
 40. One could, of course, make an argument like this about most “latent” 
reform platforms that are amenable to effective framing. But few issues are as 
closely linked to partisan politics as this one. We are already waging political 
battles in which the Index could be used as a partisan weapon.  
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system working or not? And why is the state next door doing so 
much better? 
2.  Identifying policy priorities 
A ranking provides a useful shorthand in a second way: it 
helps flag policymaking priorities. Legislators and governors 
are often bombarded with information. They hear lots of com-
plaints, listen to lots of requests for funding, and sift through 
lots of reports. What they need is something that helps them to 
separate the genuine problems from the run-of-the-mill com-
plaints, a means of distinguishing the signal from the static. A 
ranking can perform that role, as it focuses on systemic prob-
lems and provides a realistic baseline for judging performance.  
Consider, for instance, what occurred in Mexico when the 
first version of the Environmental Performance Index (then 
called the Environmental Sustainability Index) was released.41 
The EPI ranks 149 countries along twenty-five performance in-
dicators. Environmentalists had spent a lot of time trying to 
convince Mexico it had a problem. They ended up spending 
most of their time addressing low-level bureaucrats. When the 
first version of the EPI came out, ranking Mexico in the bottom 
fifth of the countries evaluated, it caught the attention of Mex-
ico’s President. The organizations that created the EPI received 
dozens of calls and emails from Mexican officials up and down 
the political hierarchy, all complaining about Mexico’s ranking 
and, eventually, trying to figure out how to fix it. Mexican bu-
reaucrats cared because the President cared.  
C.  ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS  
A final, and often underappreciated, leverage point for 
reform is election administrators—the people who do the day-
to-day work of running our election system. We usually assume 
that pressure for change can only come from the outside—from 
voters or reformers or top-level policymakers. But some of the 
most effective lobbyists for change are people working inside 
the system. Moreover, the long-term health of any bureaucracy 
depends heavily on bureaucrats’ policing themselves through 
professional norms. The Democracy Index would help on both 
fronts. It gives election administrators the information they 
need to lobby for much-needed resources. At the same time, the 
 
 41. See http://epi.yale.edu/Contents for the rankings and more informa-
tion on the EPI.  
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Index has the potential to promote stronger professional norms 
within the field. 
To that end, perhaps the most important role an Index 
could play with election administrators is to help create a con-
sensus on best practices, as professional norms may ultimately 
be more important to a well-run system than pressures from 
the outside. Professional norms are what Jerry Mashaw calls 
“soft law”42 because they rely on an informal source of power—
peer pressure. They work because government workers are just 
like the rest of us. They care what other people think, and they 
are likely to care most about the opinions of people in their own 
professional tribe. 
Anyone who lives with a teenager knows that peer pres-
sure can affect people’s behavior. Social scientists have done 
extensive work identifying the ways in which the pressure to 
conform affects individual behavior.43 Although peer pressure 
is not always a force for good, it can serve useful ends in the 
policy-making context. Many professional groups—lawyers, ac-
countants, engineers—possess a set of shared norms about best 
practices. While these norms are often informal, they cabin the 
range of acceptable behavior. When professional identity be-
comes intertwined with particular practices, a person’s sense 
that he is doing a good job depends on conforming to these 
norms. For those of us trying to suppress memories of high 
school, it is nice to know that the herd instinct can do a bit of 
good in the world. 
It is not just peer pressure that causes people to conform to 
professional standards; it is also time constraints. No one has 
the time to think through the practical and moral considera-
tions involved in every decision they make. Like voters and po-
licymakers, administrators need shorthand to guide their be-
havior. A professional consensus on best practices can 
 
 42. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountabili-
ty and the Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 
2005, at 6–7, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061& 
context=ils.  
 43. Cass Sunstein, for example, has written about the pressures of con-
formity upon individuals. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 
(2003). One of the results of conformity is a decision-making “cascade.” Id. at 
10–11. If one set of decision makers or “early movers” converge on a particular 
option, subsequent decision makers—influenced by the agreement of the first 
movers—make the same choice even if they would not have reached such a de-
cision independently. See id. Sunstein also explains both why reasonable 
people rely on the decisions of “early movers” and why this tendency some-
times has unfortunate consequences. See id. at 54–73. 
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represent a pretty sensible heuristic for figuring out the right 
choice. 
Peer pressure not only can shape individual behavior, but 
can push institutions to adopt reforms that experts have chris-
tened as best practices. Social science research on the “global 
polity”44 reveals that despite vast cultural and resource differ-
ences among nation-states, countries follow what social scien-
tists call “common models or scripts of what a nation-state 
ought to be.”45 Mimicry even happens in areas where you would 
 
 44. The global polity “consists of much more than a ‘system of states’ or 
‘world economy’ or ‘international system.’ Rather, the global environment is a 
sea teaming with a great variety of social units—states and their associated 
polities, military alliances, business enterprises, social movements, terrorists, 
political activists, nongovernmental organizations . . . .” John Boli, Sovereignty 
from a World Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED 
RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 53, 59 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001). 
For a helpful survey of this literature, see GLOBALIZATION AND ORGANIZATION: 
WORLD SOCIETY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (Gili S. Drori et al. eds., 2006); 
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociol-
ogy’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325 (1996); John W. Meyer, The World 
Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 41 
(George M. Thomas et al. eds., 1987); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and 
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144 (1997). For a general introduction to the 
social science behind the global-polity literature, see W. RICHARD SCOTT, IN-
STITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2001). Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks have led the way in connecting this literature to legal scholarship and 
exploring its potential ramifications for international law, particularly human 
rights law. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socia-
lization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Theory of Sovereign-
ty].  
 45. GILI S. DRORI ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTI-
TUTIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION at ix (2003). For instance, nation-states 
often deploy similar record-keeping systems and mandate mass education in 
school systems using similar curricula and administrative structures. Isomor-
phism and decoupling have been found in areas such as “constitutional forms 
emphasizing both state power and individual rights, mass schooling systems 
organized around a fairly standard curriculum, rationalized economic and de-
mographic record keeping and data systems, antinatalist population control 
policies intended to enhance national development,” as well as “formally equa-
lized female status and rights, expanded human rights in general, expansive 
environmental policies, development-oriented economic policy, universalistic 
welfare systems, standard definitions of disease and health care, and even 
some basic demographic variables.” Meyer et al., supra note 44, at 152–53 (ci-
tations omitted); see also Karen Bradley & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Polity 
and Gender Parity: Women’s Share of Higher Education, 1965-85, 11 RES. IN 
SOC. OF EDUC. AND SOCIALIZATION 63 (1996); David John Frank et al., What 
Counts as History: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Study of University 
Curricula, 44 COMP. EDUC. REV. 29 (2000); John W. Meyer, The Changing Cul-
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think that cultural or economic differences would trump. For 
instance, landlocked nations seem to follow global standards 
when designing their militaries, leaving them with navies 
without ports.46 Similarly, countries where “scientists and en-
gineers comprise less than 0.2% of the population, and research 
and development spending is infinitesimal” create “science poli-
cy bureaucracies.”47  
We similarly see a great deal of imitation by state and local 
governments in the United States—instances where the adop-
tion of a policy by a handful of institutions pushes others to 
adopt the same policy. At least since the late 1960s,48 social 
scientists have documented the ways in which policies spread 
from state to state.49 As one of the most recent and comprehen-
 
tural Content of World Society, in STATE/CULTURE: STATE FORMATION AFTER 
THE CULTURAL TURN (George Steinmetz ed., 1999). 
 46. See Finnemore, supra note 44, at 336–37. Another example is the fact 
that the enrollment of women in institutions of higher education increased 
around the world at roughly the same rate and at about the same time in 
Western and non-Western countries. See Bradley & Ramirez, supra note 45, at 
83–84. 
 47. Goodman & Jinks, Theory of Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1760. 
 48. See, e.g., Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations 
Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969). 
 49. This literature is vast, so what follows is only a sampling drawn pri-
marily from the work of sociologists and political scientists. See, e.g., HENRY R. 
GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1992); ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATO-
RIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (2007); KAREN MOSS-
BERGER, THE POLITICS OF IDEAS AND THE SPREAD OF ENTERPRISE ZONES 
(2000); RICHARD ROSE, LESSON-DRAWING IN PUBLIC POLICY (1993); Steven J. 
Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy Innova-
tions, 29 AM. POL. RES., 221 (2001); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, 
Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POL-
ICY PROCESS 169 (Paul A. Sabatier ed. 1999); Frances Stokes Berry & William 
D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History 
Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Frances Stokes Berry & William 
D. Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political Opportunity, 
36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715 (1992); Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the 
Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738 (1997); Michael Mintrom & 
Sandra Vergari, Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State 
Education Reforms, 60 J. POL. 126 (1998); Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, 
Systematically Pinching Ideas: A Comparative Approach to Policy Design, 8 J. 
PUB. POL’Y 61 (1988); David L. Weimer, The Current State of Design Craft: 
Borrowing, Tinkering, and Problem Solving, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 110 (1993); 
Harold Wolman & Ed Page, Policy Transfer Among Local Governments: An 
Information-Theory Approach, 15 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & 
INSTITUTIONS 477 (2002). For a critical take on some of this work, see Christo-
pher Z. Mooney, Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion, 54 POL. 
RES. Q. 103 (2001) (questioning whether regional effects on diffusion are as 
pronounced as prior work has suggested). For an examination of interstate dif-
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sive studies explains, policy ideas of all sorts—from the adop-
tion of city council-manager systems to crime control policies—
can spread rapidly from “city to city [and] from state to state.”50  
Institutions imitate each other for roughly the same kinds 
of reasons that individuals do. Sociologists and anthropologists 
tend to emphasize peer pressure and social meaning—the ways 
in which behavioral “scripts” signal prestige and become the 
model for institutional behavior.51 Political scientists, in con-
trast, tend to emphasize the ways in which time pressures lead 
officials to use the decisions of others—particularly their 
peers—as a “heuristic” or “shortcut” to guide their behavior.52 
Legislators in New York and Pennsylvania, for instance, might 
ask not “what would Jesus do,” but “what would Jersey do?” 
1.  The absence of professional norms in election 
administration 
Unfortunately, the type of professional norms that could 
shape individual and institutional behavior are largely absent 
in the elections arena, as are the vehicles for creating and 
spreading them. There is no accreditation system or training 
program used by election administrators across the country, 
nor is there a widely read trade magazine in the field. Although 
there are a number of membership groups, most are locally 
oriented and do not have a sufficiently large membership to 
generate a field-wide consensus.53 These groups also do not 
provide as much support and service as other local government 
 
fusion in different countries, see Katerina Linos, How Can International Or-
ganizations Shape National Welfare States? Evidence from Compliance with 
European Union Directives, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 547 (2007); James M. Lutz, 
Emulation and Policy Adoptions in the Canadian Provinces, 22 CAN. J. POL. 
SCI. 147 (1989); Dale H. Poel, The Diffusion of Legislation Among Canadian 
Provinces: A Statistical Analysis, 9 CAN. J. POL. S. 605 (1976); Note, When Do 
Policy Innovations Spread?: Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-Drawing, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1467 (2006). For a survey of the literature on diffusion among 
non-state organizations, see David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in Or-
ganizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 265 (1998). 
 50. KARCH, supra note 49, at 2–3. 
 51. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 52. See KARCH, supra note 49, at 7–9. 
 53. A recent survey indicates that sixty percent of local officials did not 
belong to a national professional association, and one quarter of local officials 
did not belong to any professional association. ERIC A. FISCHER & KEVIN J. 
COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ELECTION REFORM AND LOCAL ELECTION 
OFFICIALS: RESULTS OF TWO NATIONAL SURVEYS,  RL-34363, at 5–6 (2008), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34363_20080207.pdf. 
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organizations, like the National Association of Counties or the 
National Conference of State Legislatures.54  
Most importantly, the membership of these associations is 
often quite reluctant to endorse “best practices.” For instance, 
one of the rare nationwide associations, the National Associa-
tion of Secretaries of State, uses the term “shared practices” on 
the ground that local variation prevents it from identifying 
which practice is best.55 Similarly, Ray Martinez, a former 
commissioner of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 
the federal agency charged with election administration issues, 
notes that whenever the EAC even raises the possibility of 
promoting best practices, it receives “pushback.”56 One political 
scientist bemoaned the field’s resistance to best practices, not-
ing: “Every time I go to a conference, people tell me ‘that won’t 
work where I’m from,’ as if they lived on a different planet.”57 
2.  Can the Democracy Index help?  
The Democracy Index might provide a useful start toward 
building professional norms and disseminating good policies. If 
we focus on the issues deemed salient to sociologists and anth-
ropologists, the question is whether the Democracy Index could 
generate professional peer pressure among election administra-
tors or disseminate a “script” as to what constitutes a well-run 
system.  
The Democracy Index should at least provide a focal point 
for election administrators’ attention. Surely it would be hard 
for anyone to resist checking how his state or locality measured 
up on the ranking. Administrators would want to peek at the 
 
 54. Interview with Trey Grayson, Sec’y of State, Kentucky (Jan. 9, 2008) 
(on file with the author); Interview with Jonah Goldman, supra note 10; Inter-
view with Anonymous Election Official (Apr. 15, .2008) (on file with the au-
thor). It is worth noting that these organizations lack the resources they need 
to provide such broad services to their members. The National Association of 
Secretaries of State, for instance, has an extraordinarily small staff and has 
accomplished an impressive amount with the staff it possesses. Similarly, the 
institution that seems to have made the most headway in promoting profes-
sional norms is the Election Center, a Texas-based nonprofit headed up by 
Doug Lewis. The Election Center offers training and continuing education to 
election administrators while serving as an advocate for their interests. Unfor-
tunately, the Election Center is not yet big enough to reach most election ad-
ministrators. 
 55. Interview with Leslie Reynolds, Executive Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Sec’ys of 
State (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with the author). 
 56. Interview with Ray Martinez, Former Comm’r, Election Assistance 
Comm’n (Jan. 24, 2008) (on file with the author). 
 57. Interview with Anonymous (April 15, 2008) (on file with the author). 
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Index for the same reason that people “Google” their own 
names or give a book a “Washington read” (scanning the index 
to see what was said about them). If the Index were well-
designed and created by a credible group, there is good reason 
to think that an election administrator’s professional prestige 
would be increased by a high ranking, something that would be 
quite useful in a world where individuals and rule-making bo-
dies tend to mimic high-status people and institutions.58 The 
Index might develop into a professional touchstone for the field. 
In addition to generating some professional peer pressure, 
the Democracy Index could help disseminate best practices. As 
election administrators and political scientists work through 
the data, they should be able to identify what policies succeed 
and thus help create a set of “scripts” for what a well-run sys-
tem looks like.  
Consider, for example, the role that the GPP has played in 
generating and disseminating best practices among govern-
ment administrators. Why do state administrators pay atten-
tion to the GPP? Philip Joyce, one of its architects, argues that 
one reason that the GPP is so effective is because it is pub-
lished by Governing, a trade publication widely read and widely 
respected by state administrators.59 Although Governing’s main 
audience is administrators, people care about the GPP report. 
It may not affect an administrator’s political standing, but it 
matters to her professional standing.  
Someone might worry that, consistent with the view of the 
National Association of Secretaries of State, there is too much 
local variation for a set of best practices to emerge within the 
field of election administration.60 I am frankly skeptical about 
that claim, at least when it is cast in broad terms. It is hard to 
imagine that we will not be able to identify some broad poli-
cies—funding, training policies, registration systems—that 
would be useful across jurisdictions.  
Even if it is impossible to create a consensus on model poli-
cy inputs, however, it should still be possible to generate pro-
fessional norms about performance outputs. The Democracy In-
dex could create something akin to a lingua franca in the realm 
 
 58. Strang & Soule, supra note 49, at 274–75; Note, supra note 49, at 
1473. 
 59. Interview with Philip Joyce, Professor of Pub. Policy & Pub. Admin., 
George Washington University (Sept. 19, 2007) (on file with the author). 
 60. See Interview with Leslie Reynolds, supra note 55 and accompanying 
text. 
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of election administration, a shared set of performance stan-
dards that would apply to localities regardless of their policy 
practices. For instance, a professional norm might develop that, 
regardless what machine one uses, no machines should exhibit 
anything lower than a one percent residual vote rate. The In-
dex might similarly generate a set of performance baselines re-
garding the number of errors in the registration process or the 
number of poll worker complaints that fall within an acceptable 
range for a well-run system.  
If we focus on the political science work on policy diffusion, 
we can similarly identify ways in which the Democracy Index 
might help promote best practices among election administra-
tors and institutions. Political scientists think that policy diffu-
sion is most likely to occur when innovations in other states are 
visible because policymakers tend to rely on information that is 
“timely, available, and salient.”61 One of the reasons that pro-
fessional associations,62 “policy entrepreneurs,”63 and public in-
terest groups or think tanks64 matter, says Professor Andrew 
Karch, is that they “typically provide timelier, more accessible, 
and more detailed information about policy innovations” than 
other sources of information.65  
The Democracy Index could be useful in this regard, be-
cause it can help policymakers to identify the policy innovation 
needle in a haystack of widely varying practices. It is just the 
kind of “information shortcut” that scholars like Karch argue 
policymakers need. The Index would give us a pretty good 
sense about which states and localities have performed best 
and, if it is properly designed, should simultaneously offer in-
formation about which policy “inputs” drove that success. If, as 
Karch argues, “the most influential causal mechanisms” of the 
agenda-setting process are “those that can heighten the visibili-
 
 61. KARCH, supra note 49, at 8. This is, to be sure, not a conclusion 
reached only by political scientists. Sociologists Harold Wolman and Ed Page, 
for instance, have reached a similar conclusion. Wolman & Page, supra note 
49, at 498. 
 62. KARCH, supra note 49, at 105–43; Balla, supra note 49. For sociology 
work exploring similar themes in the context of private institutions, see, for 
example, Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: 
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999); Lauren B. 
Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expan-
sion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990). 
 63. Mintrom, supra note 49; Mintrom & Vergari, supra note 49. 
 64. KARCH, supra note 49. 
 65. Id. at 31. 
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ty of a policy innovation,”66 the Index moves at least one step in 
the right direction. 
Second, the Democracy Index might provide an opportunity 
to create a poor man’s substitute for a vibrant professional 
network. Imagine, for instance, that the Democracy Index web-
site provided not just the rankings and the underlying perfor-
mance data, but tables and charts within each category identi-
fying which jurisdictions followed which policies. The website 
might also provide links to extant research on the subject, even 
examples of implementing legislation and contact information 
for jurisdictions that have implemented the policy successfully. 
The Index would thus provide a portal that not only identifies 
which policies are succeeding, but gives policymakers instant 
access to the best available information on how to implement 
them. Here again, if the problem for officials is how “to sift 
through the massive amount of information that is available to 
find what is needed,”67 perhaps a well-designed DemocracyIn-
dex.com site could play a useful role.  
There is limited evidence that rankings can promote this 
type of contact and information sharing between jurisdictions. 
Richard Greene of the Government Performance Project, for in-
stance, says that states that earn a good grade on the GPP are 
regularly contacted by other states for more information about 
their policies. In Greene’s words, “States are absolutely hungry 
for good, solid, well-researched information to help them do 
what they do better.”68 
The Democracy Index is not a perfect substitute for the 
many mechanisms that social scientists have identified for 
creating professional norms and diffusing policy innovations—
far from it. But a ranking system does have the potential to 
move us a little farther in the right direction.  
IV.  THE COSTS OF SHORTCUTS   
Needless to say, there are real costs to using shortcuts to 
jumpstart the reform process, as I detail at length in my forth-
coming book.69 For instance, rankings like a Democracy Index 
simplify. It is an inevitable consequence of trying “to provide 
one answer to a question when that answer depends on several 
 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Interview with Richard Greene, supra note 29. 
 69. GERKEN, supra note 7, chs. 4 & 5. 
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bits of data,” in the words of Oxford’s Stein Ringen.70 Distilling 
information can serve many useful ends, but any effort to rank 
necessarily involves a tradeoff between precision and accessibil-
ity, or “rigor and intuition,” to use Dan Esty’s phrase.71  
It is a mistake, however, to insist that rankings necessarily 
oversimplify, as if any type of shorthand is necessarily illegiti-
mate in the policymaking world. Policymaking would be im-
possible without shorthand. If all shorthand were eliminated, 
we would not have a GDP and thus could not distinguish be-
tween an economic blip and a recession. Congress would never 
stop holding hearings, because there would always be more tes-
timony to collect. Consumer Reports would go out of business. 
Heaven knows what the New York Stock Exchange would do.  
Even disaggregated data are a form of shorthand. As Dan 
Esty notes, “quantification is about distillation.”72 The raw in-
gredients of the Democracy Index are stand-ins for a vast and 
complicated process that no individual could possibly evaluate 
first-hand. The very purpose of data is to distinguish between 
what Esty calls “signal” and “noise.”73  
Because shorthand is inevitable, the real question is what 
kind of shorthand to use. I have offered several reasons to favor 
ranking as a form of shorthand. But there are costs that ac-
company those benefits. The first is that voters will imbue the 
results with greater precision and accuracy than they deserve. 
The second is that a ranking may provide such a blunt tool for 
holding people accountable that it ends up putting pressure on 
the wrong people. Secretaries of state, for instance, may be 
pushed to do better when the real problem is the absence of 
adequate funding, something controlled by legislators or local 
commissioners. While these costs can certainly be mitigated, 
they cannot be eliminated. For example, the reasons the De-
mocracy Index is likely to succeed are precisely the reasons 
that we are wary of indices in the first place: voters may not 
look past the ranking itself. The costs associated with ranking 
are simply the flip side of its benefits: accessibility, simplicity, 
and popular appeal. Given that we cannot make these problems 
go away, we ought to be clear-eyed about acknowledging them. 
So how do we balance the benefits of accessibility against 
the costs of imprecision? While the costs of ranking are serious, 
 
 70. STEIN RINGEN, WHAT DEMOCRACY IS FOR 283 (2007). 
 71. Interview with Dan Esty, supra note 13. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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in my view the benefits still outweigh them. To begin, even if 
voters vest too much faith in an Index, at least they will be 
putting their trust in what ought to be a pretty good measure of 
democratic performance. The fact that there is not an “objec-
tive” answer on these issues does not mean that the Index’s 
architects will have a license to engage in free-form engineer-
ing. There are answers to these questions, and some answers 
will be better than others. If the Index is properly designed, 
even those who quibble with a decision should nonetheless 
think it was a reasonable one. 
On the other side of the equation, there are costs asso-
ciated with not having a ranking. We come back to the “as op-
posed to what?” question. A ranking will surely oversimplify 
the state of affairs. But, as Ringen observes, “[s]ome informa-
tion gets lost, but something else is gained.”74 Reams of com-
parative data cannot give us a clear view of how jurisdictions 
are performing overall. As with party labels, rankings tell vot-
ers about the “big thing” even if they lose track of the “little 
things.” A well-designed Index fares particularly well when 
compared to the other shortcuts citizens and policymakers use 
in evaluating these questions—anecdote, haphazard evidence of 
a crisis, or partisan labels. People place unwarranted faith in 
each of these heuristics. Each leads to oversimplification and 
errors of a more significant sort than a well-designed Index 
will. And not one of them gets us any closer to improving our 
failing system. Editorial writer Meg Greenfield once observed 
that “[e]verybody is for democracy—in principle. It is only in 
practice that the thing gives rise to stiff objections.”75 It is just 
the reverse for rankings. It is easy to be against rankings in 
principle. It is only in practice that they start to look good. 
  CONCLUSION   
A Democracy Index would provide a better set of decision-
making shortcuts than we have now. It would give voters a bet-
ter cue when they cast their vote. It would give policymakers 
the shorthand they need to figure out whether a problem exists 
and how to fix it. It might even provide a professional touch-
stone for election administrators, helping identify the kinds of 
best practices that professionals have long used as a decision-
making shortcut. 
 
 74. RINGEN, supra note 70, at 284. 
 75. Meg Greenfield, The People’s Revenge, WASH. POST, June 14, 1978, at 
A27. 
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In my view, the field has not thought hard enough about 
the ways in which shortcuts can help solve the “here to there” 
problem in election reform. One can imagine lots of other short-
cuts that might serve a useful role. Chris Elmendorf and I have 
written about the use of “citizen commissions” in blessing 
reform proposals, thus providing a potentially powerful heuris-
tic for voters trying to figure out which proposals to trust.76 Ed 
Foley has written about the useful role an “amicus” court could 
play in providing a guide to judges struggling to wade through 
arcane election rules.77 A model election code might provide a 
helpful template for legislators revising election rules, offering 
them a set of regulations “blessed” by experts and used in other 
states and thus facilitating the diffusion of best practices. 
“Shadow” districting commissions might also provide a useful 
baseline for judges evaluating the merits of a districting plan.78 
These “here to there” strategies do little more than create 
shortcuts for decision makers in the reform process. For that 
reason, they may seem quite modest. But they are the kind of 
modest reforms that can make bigger, better reform possible. 
Shortcuts like these beat out most other reform proposals for a 
simple reason: they should help make those alternatives possi-
ble. 
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 78. See Heather Gerken, Out of the Shadows: Private Redistricting Can 
Help Overcome Lawmakers’ Partisanship, LEGAL TIMES, May 5, 2008, at 62. 
